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What is This?
Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia

Dan Slater¹ and Erica Simmons²

Abstract
Democracy forces political elites to compete for power in elections, but it also often presses them to share power after the electoral dust has settled. At times these powersharing arrangements prove so encompassing as to make a mockery of putative partisan differences, and even to wipe out political opposition entirely by bringing every significant party into a “party cartel.” Such promiscuous powersharing arrangements undermine representation by loosening parties’ commitments to their core constituents, and threaten accountability by limiting voters’ capacity to remove parties from power via the ballot box. In the otherwise deeply disparate cases of Indonesia and Bolivia, the origins of promiscuous powersharing can be traced to similar periods of high political uncertainty surrounding crisis-wrecked transitions to democracy. Party elites coped with the uncertainties of transition and crisis by sharing executive power across the country’s most salient political cleavages. These arrangements forged an elitist equilibrium grounded in informal norms and networks, allowing collusive democracy to outlast the uncertain crisis conditions in which it was forged. Yet they have ultimately proven self-undermining by triggering distinctive popular backlashes, returning both countries to the political uncertainty that promiscuous powersharing was initially intended to alleviate.

¹University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
²University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI, USA

Corresponding Author:
Dan Slater, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 S. University Ave., Pick 401, Chicago, IL 60637, USA
Email: slater@uchicago.edu
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By definition, democracies must have competitive elections—but not competitive elites. Even when political parties strenuously contest free and fair elections, there is nothing about democracy per se that prevents those parties from setting aside their partisan differences after the electoral dust has settled, and building highly encompassing coalitions transcending a country’s most salient political cleavages. In some instances, postelectoral powersharing arrangements prove so comprehensive as to make a mockery of the putative partisan differences that shaped voter choice. Although we define the concept more precisely below, this is generally what we call “promiscuous powersharing.” In the most extreme scenario, promiscuous powersharing brings every significant party into a “party cartel” (Katz & Mair, 1995), wiping out meaningful political opposition entirely.

These kinds of powersharing arrangements can be seen as either surprising or unsurprising, and as either functional or dysfunctional for the quality of democracy. Democratic governance requires working majorities, and electoral institutions (especially parliamentarism) often encourage coalition building after elections rather than the construction of majoritarian parties beforehand. It is a tired truism, after all, that politics can “make strange bedfellows.” Highly encompassing powersharing pacts can also promise to stabilize democracy at times of extreme political conflict or strain: especially when these “elite settlements” take the form of “consociationalism” to dampen ethnic conflict or pactismo to ease a transition from authoritarianism. Even in less tense political times, it is not necessarily detrimental to the quality (and even survival) of democracy if partisan temperatures lower after hotly contested electoral races end.

Without denying these unsurprising and functional dimensions of democratic powersharing, this article stresses the more surprising and dysfunctional sides of the powersharing coin. One of our primary goals is to highlight the underappreciated problems for democratic representation and accountability that arise from promiscuous powersharing. When taken to the extreme of a full party cartel—as we will see in the case of Indonesia—promiscuous powersharing effectively eliminates any viable political opposition to the government. In the absence of “robust opposition” (Grzymala-Busse, 2007), incumbent parties not only face weak incentives to govern in an effective and representative fashion; they threaten to make themselves collectively
irremovable through the ballot box. This surprisingly calls into question the definitional connection between democracy and what O’Donnell (1994) calls “vertical accountability” (i.e., the possibility of politicians being removed from office by voters). Since the only prerequisite for such an outcome is for all significant parties to share power after democratic elections end—defying Riker’s (1962) classic (but oft-critiqued) claim that parties strive to build “minimum-winning coalitions”—we also find this scenario surprisingly simple for party leaders to construct. In short, democracy has less built-in immunity to the withering of vertical accountability than normally presumed.

Even when promiscuous powersharing falls short of the “cartelization” extreme—as we explore in the case of Bolivia—it holds underappreciated and troubling implications for vertical accountability. At the heart of accountability is the notion that voters should be able to vote against particular parties as well as for them. This is especially important in the case of incumbents. When an incumbent party underperforms (by whatever standard voters hold them to), voters should possess the power to “throw out the bums” (Pop-Eleches, 2010). Yet under conditions of promiscuous powersharing, voters literally cannot know that a vote for any particular party will strike a blow for kicking out objectionable incumbents, or for keeping out objectionable oppositionists. Even under the (vertical-accountability-friendly) institutions of presidentialism, leaders can be voted out of a specific office, but not out of power altogether. Just because a party leader backed the losing candidate in a presidential election—or even personally lost the presidential election in a landslide—does not automatically mean subsequent exclusion from government. Under presidentialism as well as parliamentarism, voters propose, but elites dispose on questions of access to government power.

Whether promiscuous powersharing scales up to a full-blown party cartel or not, we see “collusive democracy” as its consequence. Although collusive democracy possesses the dysfunctional consequences for accountability just discussed by (our) definition, it carries an additional dangerous consequence by implication: a heightened risk of destabilizing popular backlashes. Collusive democracy rests on a vertically exclusivist elitist equilibrium. This equilibrium is grounded in the entrenchment of self-reinforcing collusive norms and networks among party elites who may initially share power as an expedient response to political uncertainty, but subsequently come to see such pacts as appropriate and even taken for granted.

Yet the vertical exclusivity of such pacts not only compromises democratic quality. It also carries palpable dangers for the very stability of democratic politics. Here is where the procedural and substantive notions of democracy collide. If elites chosen by the people show little energy
to govern for the people, it is only natural for voters to use the procedural institutions that democracy has granted them to command the substantive gains that democracy has not. And if those procedures prove inadequate, as in Bolivia in 2002, voters may turn their efforts to holding governments accountable through the extrainstitutional weapons of contentious politics. Both as a theoretical expectation and as an empirical finding in Indonesia and Bolivia, promiscuous powersharing ultimately proves self-undermining by triggering popular—sometimes populist—backlashes. Thus far this backlash has proven more destabilizing yet, arguably, more liberating in Bolivia than in Indonesia. The deeper point is that collusive, oligarchic powersharing invites attacks by those most tenuously represented in the democratic action—not by what happens during elections, but after them.

The next section situates our arguments in leading literatures and defines our key concepts. The third section traces how political cleavages and electoral rules emerged in Indonesia and Bolivia, setting the parameters for powersharing when military rule collapsed. The fourth section details the tumultuous transitions and democratizing elections that set Indonesia and Bolivia on the road to promiscuous powersharing. The fifth section traces the origins of promiscuous powersharing in these highly dissimilar cases to similar informal practices of elite self-dealing amid high uncertainty surrounding crisis-wracked transitions to democracy. The sixth section traces the dynamics of collusive democracy over time, arguing that it paradoxically contained both self-reinforcing and self-undermining properties. On one hand, promiscuous powersharing forged an elitist equilibrium grounded in informal norms and networks, allowing collusive democracy to outlast the uncertain crisis conditions in which it was forged. Yet the oligarchic nature of this equilibrium produced popular backlashes that have undermined collusive democracy in Indonesia and Bolivia in distinctive ways: the demise of parliamentarism followed by voter dealignment (plus a brief yet informative flirtation with presidential populism) in Indonesia, and a more thoroughgoing overturning of the collusive democratic order through populist, executive domineering in Bolivia. The seventh section concludes with thoughts on the enduring difficulties of escaping political uncertainty in developing democracies.

Situating the Arguments, Defining the Concepts

Our concepts and arguments diverge in important ways, even while drawing much inspiration and guidance, from existing literature on political parties and democratic accountability. This section more precisely defines and
details this article’s conceptual building blocks: (a) political uncertainty, (b) promiscuous powersharing, (c) party cartels, (d) collusive democracy, (e) popular backlashs, and (f) executive domineering.

As Lupu and Riedl (in press) argue in this special issue’s introduction, uncertainty tends to be a defining feature of new and developing democracies, shaping their dynamics in powerful ways. Indonesia and Bolivia exhibited all three types of political uncertainty Lupu and Riedl detail during tumultuous democratic transitions: (a) regime uncertainty, (b) economic uncertainty, and (c) institutional uncertainty. Elite politicians were forced when building new democratic coalitions to confront severe unpredictability as to the prospects for economic recovery, the evolving contours of political rules, and even the fate of democracy itself.

This political uncertainty was a facilitating condition for the onset of promiscuous powersharing in both Indonesia and Bolivia. In our usage, promiscuous powersharing represents an especially flexible coalition-building practice, in which parties express or reveal a willingness to share executive power with any and all other significant parties after an election takes place, even across a country’s most important political cleavages. It is elected politicians’ lack of concern with building cleavage-consistent coalitions, and willingness to disregard the core concerns of their main constituents by shifting allegiances opportunistically, that distinguish promiscuity from the more permanent and principled all-inclusiveness commonly associated with consociational democracies.6

Promiscuous powersharing undermines democratic representation and accountability. It loosens parties’ commitments to their core constituents, as determined by a polity’s core cleavages. When leftists in Bolivia shared power with the country’s most right-wing, promilitary party, and when Indonesia’s most anti-Islamist party shared power with an assortment of Indonesia’s most Islam-oriented parties, they were engaging in powersharing that was not merely inclusive, but promiscuous. Voters had every reason to wonder after the election what exactly they had voted for. Perhaps more important for democratic accountability, promiscuous powersharing makes it impossible for voters to know ex ante who they are voting against. Representation and accountability are hindered to the extent that parties fail to represent their constituents’ cleavage-based commitments, and take the power to remove particular parties from office out of voters’ hands. In a more dynamic sense, parties that suffer “brand dilution” (Lupu, 2011) through promiscuous powersharing are prone to cascading abandonment by their core constituents. This raises the specter of party collapse and a loss of the very stability that powersharing was originally purported to provide.
The power to remove becomes especially threatened under conditions of a party cartel (Katz & Mair, 1995). By our strict definition, a party cartel exists only if every single significant party gains a share of executive power through appointments to the cabinet. Yet parties need not go to this extreme to exhibit promiscuous powersharing, which is predicated on parties’ willingness to abandon core constituencies in their opportunistic maneuvers to assemble ruling coalitions. Even when it does not assume its fully encompassing, cartelized version, as in Bolivia during the 1980s and 1990s, promiscuous powersharing affects the quality of democracy writ large. Hence we adopt the term collusive democracy to refer to democracies marked by promiscuous powersharing, whether every significant party is brought into the executive or not.

Once established, collusive democracy has both self-reinforcing and self-undermining traits. It is self-reinforcing because informal practices and networks forged during highly uncertain times will typically endure, ceteris paribus, into more stable times. Yet collusive democracy is democratic as well as collusive and offers ongoing opportunities for ordinary people to take political action outside the rubric of elitist pacts. Whenever we see mass societal involvement in efforts to weaken the grip of collusive party elites over national politics, we call these popular backlashes. It is through such popular backlashes that collusive democracy is most likely to come under threat. Such backlashes are not exogenous shocks, but endogenously generated responses to informal oligarchic exclusion in formal democratic settings.

These backlashes typically bring both dark clouds and silver linings for democratic quality. Broad popular reactions against elitist exclusivity are laborious to organize and channel and often require the leadership of charismatic figures to gain traction. Yet such figures usually struggle to make radical changes under democracy’s institutional constraints. To borrow O’Donnell’s (1994) phrasing, charismatic figures who ride to power through “vertical accountability” (i.e., direct ties to voters) are likely to feel stifled by, and hence to circumvent or disregard, institutions of “horizontal accountability” (e.g., courts, parliaments, and anticorruption commissions). Since O’Donnell’s concept of “delegative democracy” struggles to convey who is delegating what to whom, we introduce the notion of executive domineering to capture this widespread phenomenon in developing democracies.

In sum, we argue that political uncertainty during tumultuous transitions to democracy can help induce party leaders to practice promiscuous powersharing—even to the extent of constructing a full-blown party cartel—as a coping mechanism. The collusive democracy that this engenders invites popular backlashes, however, which are likely to pave the way for
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executive domineering. An apparent cure for political uncertainty at one stage can thus become a primary source of political uncertainty down the road. We now show how these causal processes have played out in surprisingly similar fashion in two deeply disparate cases.

Shaping the Parameters of Powersharing: Revolutions, Cleavages, and Electoral Rules

In the most general terms, Indonesia and Bolivia serve as a “most different systems” pairing (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). Given the countless ways that these cases vary, it is intriguing to uncover parallel patterns of promiscuous powersharing during times of severe uncertainty. These pronounced cross-case differences are methodologically useful because they allow us to control for a variety of alternative explanations specific to each case (e.g., purportedly collusive political culture). In the next section we argue that both Indonesia and Bolivia saw promiscuous powersharing originate in highly uncertain democratic transitions. This section lays the essential background for that discussion by tracing how political cleavages and electoral rules were shaped before the “third wave” of democratization hit Bolivia in the late 1970s and Indonesia in the late 1990s. In the process, we inductively uncover additional cross-case parallels that combine with uncertainty to explain why promiscuous powersharing emerged in these two cases.

The first important parallel is a revolutionary past. This is relevant for several reasons. First, histories of contentious mass politics almost certainly made it harder for party leaders to sustain exclusionary elitist pacts, while also probably helping to convince them that such elitism was essential for political stability in the first place. The strength of popular leftist revolutions also nationalized political life, making subnational ethnicity and regionalism less salient than one would expect by looking at these countries’ pluralistic and geographically fragmented social structures. Most important for our purposes, revolutions had profound consequences for which political cleavages would be most salient at the national level. This determined what would count as promiscuous as opposed to merely inclusionary in the powersharing arrangements attending democratization.

In Indonesia, independence was gained in 1949 through armed popular revolution against the Dutch. This made nationalism a potent political identifier and made the Sukarno-led Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) the country’s most important political party as independence was gained. The postrevolutionary atmosphere proved conducive to a general elite consensus favoring at least mild forms of socialist intervention and redistribution.
Partisan schisms and ideological controversies revolved more around questions of religious and nationalist identity—particularly regarding the proper role for Islam in the diverse nation’s politics—than questions of class and redistribution per se.10

Bolivia’s popular revolution occurred at a similar world-historical juncture (1952), and also propelled a mass-mobilizing party into power: the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Yet Bolivia’s revolution took place almost a century and a half after colonialism had ended. Revolution thus did not pit a cross-class coalition against a colonizer, as in Indonesia. Instead, by sparking the corporatist-style incorporation of labor and the peasantry, Bolivia’s revolution activated and organized workplace and class-based alliances. This launched a massive social transformation that politically cleaved peasants from miners and drove most of the middle class to ally with the wealthy. The upshot of revolution would thus be cleavage politics centering on questions of class in Bolivia, and rotating around questions of religion in Indonesia.11

Lengthy periods of militarized authoritarianism (1966–1998 in Indonesia, 1964–1982 in Bolivia) would mostly perpetuate these core cleavages. As is so often the case, authoritarian rule would also create a new regime cleavage between forces associated with the dictatorship and its strongest opponents. Party politics was not only about parties and their presumptive social constituencies when democracy was reintroduced; it was also about what would happen to the military and the ancien régime.12 Hence when we examine powersharing arrangements below, its promiscuity will be gauged by how starkly it transcends the class and regime cleavages in Bolivia, and the religious and regime cleavages in Indonesia.13

Powersharing is not shaped only by political cleavages, however. It is also a function of electoral rules. Like cleavages, these rules tend to be historically shaped, and to become among the most important parameters influencing democratic interactions. Here we find an additional parallel between the Indonesian and Bolivian cases. When each country democratized, it did so against the backdrop of electoral rules imposed by conservative military regimes. Specifically, both cases had well-established provisions for parliamentary selection of the president.14 Since these rules were not patently antidemocratic, they were not a prime target of democratic reformers during their struggles to uproot military rule. The upshot was that Indonesia and Bolivia were both institutionally predisposed toward “parliamentarized presidentialism” (Mayorga, 1997). By taking the selection of the president out of the hands of voters and placing it in the hands of parliament, this electoral system enhanced the presidency’s horizontal accountability (to other elites) while
weakening its vertical accountability (to voters). This heightened parliament’s capacity to impose a powersharing quid pro quo on any new president.

Yet it did not necessitate promiscuous powersharing. In both Indonesia and Bolivia, it would prove possible to build cleavage-consistent winning coalitions. Certainly nothing about the electoral system required the all-party cartel that would emerge in Indonesia or the *megacoalicion* that would arise in Bolivia. Nevertheless, it is critical to appreciate that during their countries’ tumultuous democratic transitions, party elites in Indonesia and Bolivia were not only pressed by historically defined political cleavages to *compete*. They were also given an occasion and opportunity by the inherited institution of parliamentary selection of the president to *collude*. The fact that cross-cleavage collusion indeed occurred had much to do with the severe uncertainty attending Indonesian and Bolivian democratization, as we now show.

**The Road to Promiscuous Powersharing: Tumultuous Transitions and Democratizing Elections**

Indonesia and Bolivia experienced two of the rockiest roads to democratization in recent global memory. This section divides this process into two parts: tumultuous transitions and democratizing elections.

**Tumultuous Transitions**

Chaos was a cause more than a consequence of democratization in both Indonesia and Bolivia. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime (1966–1998) shifted from a relatively stable military-dominated regime in its first decade toward a more personalized and unpredictable authoritarian arrangement by the 1990s (Slater, 2010). As in many aging autocracies, political uncertainty became endemic — no one knew what would follow Suharto or even what he would do on any given day. By the mid-1990s, Indonesia was experiencing an upsurge in ethnic riots and conflict (Sidel, 2006), and Suharto was confronting rising criticism from leaders on both sides of Indonesia’s nationalist-Islamic cleavage: Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the nation’s charismatic founding hero, and Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of Indonesia’s (and the world’s) largest mass Islamic organization (Aspinall, 2005). When a devastating financial crisis roared across Asia in 1997–1998, the Suharto regime’s response combined incoherence, inconsistency, and incompetence (MacIntyre, 2001). By the time Suharto resigned in the face
of massive street protests and cascading elite defections in May 1998, Indonesia’s national currency had plummeted from 2,250/dollar to below 17,000/dollar.

The fallout from Suharto’s fall was deeply uncertain. Although Suharto managed to follow constitutional procedures and transfer power to his vice president, B. J. Habibie, his successor lacked political support and legitimacy. Habibie initially declared that he would serve out the remaining four-plus years of Suharto’s five-year term. Yet mass protest and elite opposition to this democratic delay continued, even from within the old ruling party, Golkar, which Habibie ostensibly led. Within a week of assuming the presidency, Habibie announced that free and fair national elections—the first in Indonesia since 1955—would be held within 12 months.

Meanwhile, the military loomed in the foreground more than the background. Despite splitting over how fiercely to defend Suharto’s presidency, it remained the most powerful institution in the land. Its leader, Wiranto, had stood beside Suharto, both literally and figuratively, as the dictator grudgingly ceded power. As the economy remained in free fall, ethnic riots worsened, and provincial separatism gathered steam in Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua, the military’s patience with Indonesia’s democratic experiment remained an open question. Little wonder that Indonesians joked that the “Habibie” presidency in 1998–1999 stood for “Hari Bikin Bingung”: loosely, a time of utter confusion.

The collapse of military rule in Bolivia in the late 1970s and early 1980s was a similarly white-knuckled affair. Indeed, Bolivia arguably boasts Latin America’s most chaotic transition to democratic rule; this was the period when Bolivia became “a byword for sheer political anarchy” (Dunkerley, 1984, p. 348). As the country’s export boom began to fizzle, General Hugo Banzer faced an increasingly mobilized and aggrieved society. A massive devaluation, rising corruption within the military, and an unfavorable end to negotiations with Chile over sea access alienated Banzer’s middle- and upper-class supporters. The military proved unable to contain union-led unrest, and a massacre in Cochabamba drove much of the historically conservative peasantry into the prodemocracy camp.

In late 1977 Banzer announced elections for the following July and formally lifted constraints on party formation and activity (Gamarra, 1997, p. 366). The MNR reemerged with former president Victor Paz Estenssoro at the helm. The party retained significant peasant support and Paz Estenssoro’s revolutionary legacy gave him centrist appeal and name recognition. Further to the left, former MNR leader Hernán Siles Zuazo ran under the label of the MNRI (the “left” MNR), and joined with a third political force: the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), founded in 1970 to include all of the “major left groupings” in the country (Klein, 1992, p. 263).
Banzer intended to install a “democratically” elected military candidate as the new president. However, the military was not well practiced in the arts of electoral competition and manipulation. The 1978 election officially ended with the military’s candidate, Juan Pereda, well in the lead. But the evidence for fraud was clear (Dunkerley, 1984, pp. 245-247). Having botched its attempt to manipulate the election, the military staged a coup.

What followed was a more halting, slow-motion, and setback-stricken transition to procedural democracy than what would later transpire in Indonesia. Between 1978 and 1982 a procession of two civilian and seven military governments ruled Bolivia. Elections in 1979 ended with no majority candidate. Unable to choose a victor from among the contenders, the legislature decided to appoint a caretaker president and rerun elections the following year. The military chose otherwise and staged a coup. A civilian regime held elections again in 1980, and the vote was once again divided among the three major parties (see Table 1). Having learned from their previous mistakes, the legislature came together to support the plurality victor—Siles Zuazo of the MNRI-MIR alliance. But the army refused to let Siles take office and staged yet another coup. It would not be until 1982 that the Bolivian military—like its later Indonesian counterparts facing a collapsing economy and sustained popular mobilization—would step aside.

**Democratizing Elections**

Looking back, it is clear that democratically elected parliaments and executives definitively displaced military rule in 1999 in Indonesia and in 1982 in

| Table 1. Vote Share (percentages) for Bolivia’s Major Parties, 1979–2005 |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| UDP Slatea      | 37.92  | 39.74  |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| MIR             | 10.19  | 21.83  | 17.12  | 16.32  |        |        |        |        |
| MNRI            | 5.48   |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| MNR             | 34.52  | 20.66  | 30.36  | 25.65  | 35.55  | 18.59  | 22.46  | 6.47   |
| ADNb            | 14.41  | 17.26  | 32.82  | 25.24  | 21.05  |        |        |        |
| % won by main parties | 86.85 | 77.67  | 78.85  | 72.72  | 56.60  | 58.46  | 38.78  | 6.47   |


a. The UDP slate included the MIR and the MNRI, as well as a number of smaller parties.
b. 1993 data reflect MIR support through the AP coalition.
Bolivia. Yet these elected party elites did not have the benefit of hindsight. Histories of military intervention were at once long and vividly recent; there could be no complacency about soldiers remaining in their barracks. Compounding this regime uncertainty was the inconclusiveness of democratizing elections as to which civilians would rule. Having produced no majorities, founding elections in Indonesia and Bolivia initially perpetuated political uncertainty more than they resolved it. Since voters had not clearly sorted majorities and minorities, that hard and uncertain job was left to the politicians.

Leading parties in both cases enjoyed ample opportunity to build cleavage-consistent winning coalitions. In Bolivia, such an outcome initially came to pass. The political right, anchored in the newly formed Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN), joined with left and center forces in October 1982 to support the instatement of the Congress elected in July 1980. Yet the left and right did not initially share power. Reflecting a clear regime cleavage, the center (MNR) and left (MIR and MNRI) joined forces to keep the ADN candidate, General Hugo Banzer, from assuming the presidency. MNRI candidate Siles Zuazo took the oath of office and Bolivia returned to constitutional democracy. As in most of Latin America, opponents of military rule made sure the military’s strongest backers would be excluded from Bolivia’s new democratic order. Yet as we will see, this cleavage-consistent coalition would patently fail to bridle political instability.

Initial powersharing in Indonesia in 1999 involved a more complicated set of coalitional calculations. Amid Indonesia’s cross-cutting regime and religious cleavages, a variety of cleavage-consistent majority coalitions were possible at the special parliamentary session of October 1999, when the presidency would be decided (see Table 2). The big winner in the June 1999 parliamentary vote, with almost 34% of the tally, had been Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDIP: Indonesia’s primary organized expression of nationalist as opposed to Islamic sentiment. The old-guard authoritarian ruling party, Golkar, was a distant second at 22%. Trailing PDIP and Golkar were three parties with their social roots

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.5</td>
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<td>PKB</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86.7</td>
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Table 2. Vote Totals from Indonesia’s June 1999 National Election
in Islamic organizations: the PKB, PAN, and PPP. Although more than 100 parties had contested the election, these leading five had secured almost 87% of the vote, and would determine—along with the military, which still held approximately 7% of the parliament through appointed seats—whether Golkar’s Habibie would remain in office, and who would replace him if not.

The 4 months between the June popular election and the October special parliamentary session saw plenty of intense coalitional politicking; but there was as yet no sign of promiscuous powersharing. Cleavages rather than cross-cleavage collusion were channeling the action. At the center was Megawati, widely assumed to be the president in waiting. Pundits mostly expected her PDIP to team up with Abdurrahman Wahid’s PKB to reject President Habibie’s “accountability speech” to the parliament and deliver the presidency to Megawati. Indeed, Wahid repeatedly expressed his support for Megawati as the special session approached. Yet these two parties did not constitute a majority, and the PDIP exerted surprisingly little effort at crafting either a nationalist or reformist coalition, seemingly waiting for the presidency to fall into Megawati’s lap. It appears that this unstrategic inaction was largely the result of uncertainty over the details of Indonesia’s (suddenly relevantly democratic) electoral rules. Incorrectly thinking that the presidency would be decided by a parliamentary plurality rather than majority, the PDIP let the coalition-building initiative slip to other, smaller parties (Ambardi, 2008).

What initially countered the Megawati steamroller was an emerging alliance of small Islamic parties, dubbed the “Central Axis.” Though short on numbers, these parties were long on moral authority. Their leading figure, Amien Rais of PAN, had been the most outspoken and courageous elite opponent of the Suharto regime during its dying days. Although dreams of a reformist coalition largely hinged on hopes that Amien would team up with the PDIP’s Megawati and the PKB’s Wahid, Amien’s apparent Islamic turn before the 1999 parliamentary session put these hopes on ice. When a series of Islamic politicians complained that Megawati was insufficiently pious (and male) to merit the presidency, the nationalist-Islamic cleavage reared its divisive head. Yet ironically, the result of intense cleavage-based competition at the special parliamentary session would be a cartelized coalition, devoid of clear positioning on any of Indonesia’s salient political cleavages.

**The Origins of Promiscuous Powersharing: Coping With Uncertainty by Colluding**

Promiscuous powersharing was the eventual but not the inevitable result of highly uncertain democratic transitions. As of October 1982 in Bolivia and
October 1999 in Indonesia, democratic powersharing was being shaped by cleavages rather than collusion. Yet ongoing uncertainty in the political, economic, and social realms pressed party leaders to share power in much wider ways than had been expected or experienced before.

Indonesia’s 1999 special parliamentary session opened with an inspiring triumph for the forces of democratic reform. President Habibie’s “accountability speech” was roundly rejected, paving the way for Indonesia to anoint its first democratically elected chief executive in nearly half a century. Yet this anointing would be the work of parliament, not the people.

After striking a blow for democracy by removing Habibie, parliament undermined the popular will by denying the presidency to the parliamentary election’s landslide winner, Megawati Sukarnoputri. The Islamic “Central Axis” had convinced Megawati’s erstwhile ally, the PKB’s Abdurrahman Wahid, to stand as an alternative presidential candidate. With sweeping support from Islamic parties as well as strong backing from old-guard elements in the military and Golkar, Wahid outpolled Megawati 373–313 and captured the presidency: despite the fact that his PKB had barely received 10% of the popular vote, compared to the 34% won by Megawati’s PDIP. With Megawati defeated, the new coalition appeared poised to take on an Islam-centered and ancien régime–friendly flavor. Ominously for prospects of deeper democratic reform, the two leading candidates for the vice presidency were the new leader of Golkar, Akbar Tandjung; and the head of the military, Wiranto.

Yet the spirit of democratic nationalism that had overthrown Dutch colonialism and helped topple military rule would not be easily silenced. Riots erupted in the major PDIP strongholds of Jakarta, the national capital, as well as Bali. This unrest occurred against a backdrop of ongoing financial crisis, continuing outbreaks of ethnic bloodshed, and worsening separatist sentiment (East Timor had formally separated from Indonesia just a month earlier). Stability was thus a greater concern for Indonesian party elites in October 1999 than cleavage consistency. Golkar’s Akbar and the military’s Wiranto stepped aside as vice presidential candidates, and parliament tapped Megawati as vice president in a landslide. This tempered nationalist outrage and tamed nationalist protest.

If the new Wahid–Megawati tandem had been free to construct a cabinet as they saw fit, the prospects for a genuinely reformist coalition would have been excellent. As a matter of mathematics, Golkar and the military could easily have been excluded from the new government, much as Hugo Banzer and his ADN were initially forced into opposition in Bolivia in 1982. Yet Wahid had accrued too many political debts in securing the presidency to build a limited coalition of any kind. Instead of an ideologically compatible
or minimum-winning coalition, Indonesian democracy was born with an all-encompassing party cartel. Backroom negotiations among all five major faction leaders (Wahid, Megawati, Amien Rais, Golkar’s Akbar, and army head Wiranto) produced a cabinet that had to be expanded from 25 to 35 members to dissipate disputes over each group’s share of the pie. Every significant party gained seats in the cabinet—even the Islamic PK, a minuscule “mosquito” party that had gained only 1.4% of the popular vote. Ironically, the vigorous party-led mobilization of reformist and religious blocs in the 1999 election and parliamentary session produced a ruling coalition devoid of clear positioning on either the reformist or religious divide.

This collusive turn in Indonesia mirrored (and surpassed) the collusive turn taken by Bolivian party elites in the mid-1980s. Although the MNRI-MIR coalition under President Siles leveraged its parliamentary plurality in 1982 to secure the presidency through a leftist coalition, this cleavage-consistent powersharing arrangement failed to produce political stability. The Siles administration proved unable to pass economic reforms as hyper-inflation (to the tune of more than 2,000% in 1984) wreaked havoc on Bolivia. In the context of a fiscal crisis, endemic popular protest, and the looming threat of another military takeover, Siles agreed to step aside early and hold presidential elections.

In 1985, the politics of collusion began in earnest. Banzer’s ADN won a plurality in the July election but did not receive the absolute majority necessary to claim the presidency. For the MNR and MIR, a coalition with each other continued to be favorable to a Banzer presidency. The MIR agreed to back the MNR, allowing second-place candidate Paz Estenssoro to claim victory.

But this cleavage-consistent anti-ADN alliance did not last long. The ADN’s strength in the congressional round combined with the lessons of Siles’s disastrous tenure implied that an alliance with Banzer would be a necessary evil. After taking office, Paz Estenssoro created an “informal pact” with the ADN (Klein, 1992, p. 274), offering access to patronage in exchange for congressional support (Gamarra, 1994). This “Pact for Democracy” brought the general who oversaw the most repressive regime in recent Bolivian history—and who had gone on to serve as the representative of Bolivia’s most conservative forces—formally into the fold. The pact eased the implementation of market-oriented economic reforms, allowing Paz Estenssoro to maintain critical congressional support through a period of painful economic adjustment. Perhaps most important, the pact gave Paz Estenssoro the coalitional muscle to dismantle labor’s remaining power and place political initiative squarely in the hands of Bolivia’s elitist parties (Mayorga, 1997). Although the middle
classes benefited from the spoils of new government jobs that proliferated under the subsequent eruption of *empleomanía*, popular sectors were cut out of the powersharing game in both programmatic and patronage terms.

**The Dynamics of Promiscuous Powersharing: Self-Reinforcing Versus Self-Undermining Tendencies**

Although promiscuous powersharing had its origins in Indonesia and Bolivia in highly uncertain transitional times, the phenomenon is not a straightforward product of uncertainty alone. Once established, promiscuous powersharing has exhibited an intriguing combination of self-reinforcing and self-undermining dynamics. Rather than simply being an expedient stopgap measure, promiscuous powersharing became seen by political elites as appropriate. Even as uncertainty declined, collusion deepened. Yet since politics remained procedurally democratic as well as substantively collusive, party elites could not play their powersharing games unmolested. We first explore the cementing of promiscuous powersharing after severe political uncertainty had passed, then detail how voter dealignment and executive domineering have undermined party collusion (to differing degrees and in different ways) in both Indonesia and Bolivia.

**Reasserting Promiscuity**

Indonesia experienced a backlash against party collusion within a year of its birth in October 1999, forcing a quick reassertion of the promiscuous pact. This backlash began in the form of executive domineering, not a groundswell of dissatisfaction from below. Chafing under the constraints of a cabinet he did not choose and could not control, President Wahid began purging PDIP and Golkar representatives from the cabinet in June 2000. Since Wahid had gained the presidency only by promising to share his cabinet with all parties, and controlled only around 10% of the parliament through his PKB, these cabinet reshuffles prompted a powerful collective reaction from parliamentary elites. Impeachment proceedings began in late 2000, and were concluded with Wahid’s removal in August 2001. Remarkably, the cartel that had united in 1999 to elevate Wahid and defeat Megawati had reunited in 2000–2001 to elevate Megawati and defeat Wahid.

It is hard to imagine a more vivid example of party cartelization through promiscuous powersharing. Recall that Megawati had been denied the
presidency in 1999 in large measure because of what was perceived to be her borderline secularity in a pious nation. Many leading Islamic politicians had objected to her candidacy on religious grounds. Yet the specter of exclusion from cabinet seats appeared sufficient to make them overlook such principles. Megawati even endorsed the leader of the Islamic PPP to be her vice president, even though he had been one of the loudest voices decrying a female presidency less than two years earlier. Although the Indonesian economy had begun to recover and political violence over issues of ethnicity and territorial sovereignty had begun to recede, party politicians saw full-fledged collusive democracy as the proper way to proceed.

Powersharing grew more promiscuous over time in Bolivia as well. The 1989 elections resulted in the most collusive of pacts (refer back to Table 1). MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada ran a vicious campaign, attacking both the MIR and the ADN in equal measure. (Although powersharing after elections may have been promiscuous, elite competition during elections remained fierce.) Sánchez de Lozada emerged with a plurality, but with the ADN and MIR close behind. An MIR-ADN alliance catapulted third-place MIR candidate Jaime Paz Zamora into the presidency. The “Patriotic Agreement” that solidified this unexpected union is a consummate example of promiscuous powersharing; the agreement blurred the lines between what had been the party of Bolivia’s workers and the party of Bolivia’s wealthy, white elites.

The MIR-ADN alliance left voters unclear as to what their selections at the ballot box would ultimately mean. The first-place candidate had been left out of the pact altogether, and the remaining two quickly abandoned their core constituencies. The “leftist” MIR adopted the previous administration’s economic platform and declared a state of siege, arresting hundreds of union leaders. The MIR and ADN became inextricably linked in the minds of voters, and the left and right—so long a defining cleavage in Bolivian politics—became effectively indistinguishable (Centellas, 2007, p. 183). Perhaps the clearest message from the election was that a vote for the “left” could now mean a vote against labor’s interests as surely as a vote for the “right.” As the 1993 elections approached, neoliberal reforms deepened and patronage flows constricted, and voters began to abandon Bolivia’s traditional parties in droves (see Table 1).

**Undermining Promiscuity**

These revitalized promiscuous powersharing arrangements would not go unpunished at the polls. In Indonesia, the popular backlash began even
before the 2004 national elections, in a concerted civil-society movement to amend the electoral rules. Frustrated with party elites’ stranglehold on power, democracy activists pressed growing demands for direct presidential elections. By 2002, the momentum behind the electoral reform movement was so strong that no party wanted to be seen as the blocker of change. Indonesia’s second post-Suharto election would thus take place under very different parameters than its first; voters would choose their parliament and their president in 2004.

This raised the prospect that a directly elected president might take a stab at executive domineering, as President Wahid had in 2000–2001. This would be the most obvious way in which direct presidential elections might undermine collusive democracy. Yet even before the 2004 presidential elections, signs of trouble for the cartel became evident. In the April 2004 parliamentary elections, remarkably, all five major parties in the cartel saw their vote shares decline. By far the biggest loser was the leader of the cartel, President Megawati’s PDIP, which saw its vote share plummet from almost 34% to less than 19%. Megawati thus appeared highly vulnerable to a populist challenge in the September 2004 presidential vote.

For a mix of structural and contingent reasons, Indonesia’s first-ever presidential elections produced no “outsider” alternative to Megawati or her cartel partners. The main structural reason was that electoral rules specified that any presidential candidate needed to be endorsed by a major political party. Ultimately five party leaders contested the presidency, all of whom had deep experience operating within the party cartel. Underscoring the continuing promiscuity of the powersharing process, negotiations over presidential–vice presidential pairings after the April parliamentary vote showed that virtually everybody in Indonesia’s political elite was willing to pair up with anybody else (Slater, 2004). The more contingent barrier to a successful “outsider” campaign was the burgeoning popularity of a consummate insider: retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who had served as a coordinating minister in the cabinets of Wahid and Megawati alike. His resounding victory over Megawati in the 2004 direct presidential election ushered in an era of a stronger presidency.

But it has not (yet) produced a domineering presidency. SBY did not follow his thumping 2004 victory by sidelining the parties that backed his rival, but by embracing them. Although ancien régime Golkar and the Islamic PPP eagerly returned to the cabinet, Megawati’s PDIP became a solitary holdout. Promiscuous powersharing was put to an even greater test after the 2009 elections when, yet again, all five of Indonesia’s original leading parties saw their parliamentary vote shares plummet. Having gained more than 85% of
the popular vote in 1999, the original big five had captured barely 65% in 2004, and less than 45% in 2009 (see Table 3). Yet even after SBY’s landslide 2009 presidential reelection, the president continued to publicly invite the PDIP (along with all his existing partners) to join his coalition. Despite the creeping dealignment and presidentialization of politics, promiscuous power-sharing persists, even as the PDIP’s self-imposed exclusion from the executive has made a full-blown cartel a thing of the recent past (and perhaps the near future). Although such elite promiscuity is now widely recognized to have compromised democratic quality in Indonesia, analysts still generally credit it with securing democratic stability.16

Leading scholars said much the same thing about the stabilizing effects of promiscuous powersharing after a decade of its practice in Bolivia as well. By the early 1990s, Bolivia’s collusive approach had seemingly worked so well that the country’s democratic consolidation was widely being declared a success (Malloy, 1991; Mayorga, 1997; Whitehead, 2001). Yet governing coalitions remained so far removed from their constituents that the system resembled “democracy on stilts” (Centellas, 2007). As the results of the 1993 elections show, the system was already showing signs of strain; the ADN and MIR captured only 21% of the vote (less than half of what they had garnered 4 years earlier), and new parties began to emerge as viable alternatives.

With Sánchez de Lozada at the helm, the MNR returned to power fully aware that Bolivia’s established parties faced a legitimacy crisis. Small populist parties such as the Unidad Cívica Solidaridad (UCS) and the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) had surged in the polls; a backlash was clearly brewing. Sánchez de Lozada had already responded to the growing groundswell of indigenous political assertion by offering the vice presidency to the leader of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MRTK). After his victory he went a step further and incorporated the UCS and MBL into his ruling

| Table 3. Parliamentary Vote Share (percentages) Decline for “Big 5” Parties, 1999–2009 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                               | 1999  | 2004  | 2009  |
| PDIP                          | 33.8  | 18.5  | 14.0  |
| Golkar                        | 22.5  | 21.6  | 14.5  |
| PKB                           | 12.6  | 10.6  | 4.9   |
| PPP                           | 10.7  | 8.2   | 5.3   |
| PAN                           | 7.1   | 6.4   | 6.0   |
| Total                         | 86.7  | 65.3  | 44.7  |

coalition. Yet these groups’ opportunistic participation in the promiscuous powersharing game shattered their “outsider” credentials rather than providing the MNR-led government with popular credibility.

Sánchez de Lozada’s next response was to pursue two major electoral reforms: one aimed at political decentralization, the other at the introduction of directly elected congressional representatives. Electoral reforms were thus clearly endogenous to a decade of pactismo and the backlash it had begun to spawn. Intended to forestall the dealignment of an increasingly uncaptured electorate (Grindle, 2000), electoral reforms served to do exactly the opposite, offering Bolivian citizens expanded opportunities to strike a democratic blow against exclusivist party elites.

Elections in 1997 signaled growing discontent. In 1979 Bolivia’s three major parties had garnered 88% of the vote; by 1997 their share had dropped to 58% (see Table 1). An MIR-ADN alliance was no longer enough to propel either party to the presidency. However, by teaming up with the UCS and newly emergent, anti-neoliberal Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA), the ADN’s Banzer was able to prevail. What was popularly known as the mega-coalición would offer Bolivia’s most extreme example of promiscuous powersharing. Yet it came at a time when democratic stability had already been well established. Each party’s willingness to abandon its core constituencies could no longer be explained away by the exigencies of an uncertain transition.

Unrest in 2000 sent a strong signal that the collusive system was under worsening strain, and the 2002 elections broadcast the news loud and clear. Although the MIR and MNR were able to scrape together enough votes to maintain a hold on the presidency, the second-place showing of the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) and coca union leader Evo Morales sent shock waves through the system. The MAS had risen from relative obscurity in less than six months. Collusive democracy had produced dealignment; the rise of MAS signaled the beginnings of realignment.

Sánchez de Lozada’s second (unfinished) term, from 2002 to 2005, was Bolivia’s final instantiation of party collusion. Yet the seeds were sown for the demise of the system long before the missteps that plagued Sánchez de Lozada’s administration. Unable to assume power through Bolivia’s electoral institutions, Morales looked for extrainstitutional means to wrest control from the country’s political elites (Eaton, 2006). The MAS registered opposition in the streets and effectively “destabilized” the traditional party system (Gamarra, 2003, p. 313). Facing widespread popular protest, Bolivia’s elected government collapsed. Sánchez de Lozada was forced to step down and flee the country in the fall of 2003. Vice president Carlos Mesa assumed the...
presidency but lasted less than 20 months in office; he was forced to resign by extensive popular opposition in June 2005. Morales won the presidential election six months later with 54% of the vote.

Traditional parties had so effectively removed themselves from the electorate that they were seen not merely as having abandoned their initial constituencies, but as having divorced themselves from the Bolivian nation. Morales crafted a nationalist, ethnopolitical discourse that activated ethnic and regional cleavages while capitalizing on the isolation of traditional parties (Madrid, 2008). Unlike the CONDEPA, which imploded along with its newfound coalition partners in 2002, the MAS consistently eschewed the pact-making practices of the recent past: a choice that helps explain its stunning success. Political opposition crumbled and Morales won reelection with a resounding 64% of the vote in 2009. Collusive democracy had collapsed in the face of its failure to channel citizen demands. Executive domineering (or, in the view of Morales’s detractors, authoritarian populism) took its place.

Conclusion

Democratic uncertainty is a common feature and a critical factor during times of democratic transition. Feeling threatened by both highly mobilized populations and highly politicized militaries, party elites in Indonesia and Bolivia perhaps unsurprisingly came together to forge highly inclusive governing coalitions. The promiscuous paths each country took, however, were hardly unavoidable; inclusiveness for the sake of democratic stability did not require the promiscuous collusion that followed. Leading parties opportunistically disregarded the cleavages that had long shaped popular politics, becoming increasingly indistinguishable from each other and isolated from the electorate in the process. Instead of ensuring democratic stability, these pacts ultimately heralded their own demise, triggering electoral reforms, voter dealignment, and popular backlashes that either plunged the political system back into deep uncertainty (as in Bolivia) or raised the specter of such an eventuality coming to pass (as in Indonesia).

Unfortunately, the overturning of collusive systems does not typically usher in eras of high-functioning democratic representation. Rather, we see a tendency for collusive democracies to cycle toward what O’Donnell called “delegative democracies,” or what we have depicted as executive domineering. Such personalism is not merely a function of presidential predilections, but a direct response to the institutional constraints that democracy entails in combination with its openness to popular participation.
The shift to executive domineering has been far more pronounced in Bolivia than in Indonesia, at least for now. To some degree this is the result of the differing political origins of Bolivia’s Morales and Indonesia’s SBY: the former a consummate outsider, the latter a consummate insider. Executive domineering in Bolivia reflects not only the legacy of party collusion, but the programmatic ambitions of a genuinely antisystem president. Indonesia’s SBY has avoided the kind of radical neoliberal reforms that helped bring Bolivia’s collusive rulers to such grief, while also refraining from the kind of radical redistributive reforms that many impoverished Indonesians undoubtedly crave. By contrast, Morales’s first order of business was to implement radical political changes, adopting a new constitution and sweeping economic reforms. But he has needed to attempt this “refounding” of the Bolivian nation within the confines of liberal democratic institutions. This has posed acute challenges for Morales (see Postero, 2010). In policy making, he has relied extensively on executive decrees and referenda. Minority concerns have been routinely trampled, and the MAS has manipulated rules to secure votes for extensive constitutional reforms. The kinds of deep structural changes necessary to reform a substantively exclusionary system may ironically predispose reformist politicians toward exclusionary political practices of their own.

Yet executive domineering tends to create a contentious backlash in its own right. In circumventing democratic institutions, the MAS incites the opposition to do the same. Taking a page out of Morales’s playbook, opposition leaders have turned to violent protest as a vehicle for participating in the political process. In 2008 the autonomy movement in the “media luna” region forcibly seized government buildings in the department of Santa Cruz, and at least 11 indigenous MAS supporters died in fierce partisan clashes in the northern department of Pando. By refraining from sending in national troops, Morales showed political restraint and headed off a widely feared escalation of the conflict; after two weeks the confrontation was largely over.

This particular outcome leads us to make two concluding general points. The first is that there is no easy escape from political uncertainty in developing democracies. Promiscuous powersharing and executive domineering are only partial equilibria because they are inherently exclusionary: of popular involvement in the former case, and of parliamentary involvement in the latter. The promise of promiscuous powersharing to produce lasting democratic stability ultimately proves to be false. When uncertainty is reduced, it is likely a function of something else entirely: executive self-restraint. In both Indonesia and Bolivia, highly popular and empowered presidents have thankfully neither abused their authority nor attacked their
rivals to the full extent of their potential powers. Hence in the final analysis, we are struck not only by how little immunity democracy possesses against promiscuous powersharing and a withering of vertical accountability. We are also struck by how much democratic stability rests on something its own formal procedures cannot easily guarantee: the self-restraint of popularly elected chief executives.

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Notes

1. The literatures on the virtues and vices of powersharing after ethnic conflict and dictatorship are substantial. On the necessity of elite settlements and consensus for initial democratic stability, see Higley and Gunther (1992). See Lijphart (1977) for an original statement on consociationalism and O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) for a similarly seminal founding work on pacted democratic transitions.

2. Robust political opposition in democracies is perforce party opposition. Nongovernmental organizations and activists can criticize the government, but they cannot replace it through democratic procedures.

3. As Schmitter and Karl (1991) put it in an influential definitional statement, “Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (p. 76, italics original). The analysis to follow shows that this is not necessarily true:
even in systems where elections are utterly free and fair and even when a purely proceduralist, minimalist definition of democracy is used.

4. Riker’s formulation presupposes that (a) elites are eager to impose defeat upon each other and that (b) power is conceived as divisible and zero-sum. Yet when elites have strong preexisting relationships and perceive their strength as enhanced rather than diminished by a large number of followers and allies, these presuppositions fail to hold.

5. See Karl (1990) for a classic statement and Fishman (2010) for a recent contribution.

6. Promiscuous powersharing thus has a fundamentally different political meaning and effect than consociationalism, despite its superficial structural similarities.

7. There is no general benchmark at which parties become “significant” because it depends on context whether a party with, say, 10% of the vote is a significant player in national politics or not. This is a function of electoral rules and the perceived potential trajectory of the parties in question.

8. This usage diverges from more recent work by Katz and Mair (2009), who now insist that what a party cartel “clearly does not denote is simply those parties that are in government (holding ministerial portfolios, or the equivalent) at any particular time.” However, “it does extend to all parties that have a reasonable expectation that they might be included in a national governing coalition” (p. 757, italics original). Hence, when Katz and Mair now say “party cartel,” they hew very closely to what we call “promiscuous powersharing.”

9. It would be only in the late 1990s that ethnicity and regionalism would become defining forces in Bolivian politics. Regionalism and subnational ethnicity ceased to be among the most important drivers of Indonesian politics after the military crushed a series of regional rebellions in the late 1950s.

10. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) would try mightily to reorient national politics toward issues of class and radical redistribution in the early to mid-1960s but was demolished in a military-led (and Islam-infused) pogrom beginning in 1965. For a fuller discussion of the development of political cleavages in Indonesia, see Slater (2011).

11. These categories play out very differently in our cases, however, than in the classic understandings of class and religious cleavages developed in the study of European politics. In Indonesia, Islam is deeply divided between “modernist” and “traditionalist” streams, and should not be distinguished from “secularism,” but from pluralistic nationalism; and in Bolivia, class indexes occupational differences (i.e., miner vs. peasant), not just wealth differences.

12. The heterodox programmatic commitments of Bolivia’s military governments complicated the regime cleavage; yet shared commitments to procedural democracy ultimately helped to bring together civilian forces on the left, right, and center against military rule.
13. If one thinks of cleavages in strongly sociological terms, what we call the regime cleavage might well be described as a “divide” instead of a “cleavage.” Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka (1999) argue that “cleavages are divides that exhibit longevity and entrenchment” (p. 262). In our usage, the longevity and entrenchment of cleavages is an empirical question. Especially during times of political transition and crisis, lines of cleavage may be newly emergent yet intensely felt. For our purposes the big issue is whether powersharing across some political dimension represents a betrayal of a core constituency. To share power with an old dictator and/or his or her allies is liable to be perceived as a betrayal of similar or greater magnitude to sharing power across a class or religious divide, which can be more readily portrayed as a necessary compromise for national stability.

14. The 1967 Bolivian Constitution called for parliamentary election of the president in the event that no single candidate received a majority of the votes. As it was not until Morales’s election in 2005 that any candidate received the requisite majority, this became the de facto system for presidential selection. Parliamentary selection of the president had more formal, de jure standing in Indonesia throughout the authoritarian period.

15. Collective greed for patronage provides an explanation for cartelization that is efficient, but insufficient. Our argument is not that party elites promiscuously shared power to cope with uncertainty and not to seize patronage-rich ministries, but that widely perceived uncertainty offered party elites a golden opportunity to do so.

16. As one leading analyst recently put it, “The success of Indonesia’s democracy and its poor quality are two sides of the same coin. It was precisely by achieving a low-quality outcome that Indonesian democratization proceeded so smoothly” (Aspinall, 2010, p. 32).

17. CONDEPA’s disintegration offers further evidence that, in abandoning their core constituencies to gain a piece of the political pie, parties flirt with their own demise. Morales’s MAS would draw considerable support from former CONDEPA voters.

18. As Mietzner (2012) argues, the “anti-reformist elites” incorporated after Indonesia’s democratic transition are now attacking democracy from within. Mietzner is correct that Indonesian democracy is not in danger because ordinary Indonesians embrace authoritarianism; the biggest danger for democratic stability is that oligarchic exclusion will lead them to pursue populist inclusion, unintentionally empowering a strongman with little tolerance for democratic constraints. Current fears of such a scenario center on disgraced former general Prabowo Subianto, whose lucrative ties to the Suharto family and self-styled transformation into a populist champion helped him gain a spot as Megawati’s vice presidential candi-
date in 2009 and position himself as one of the front-runners for the presidency in 2014.

References


**Bios**

**Dan Slater** is associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, 2010) and coeditor of *Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis* (Stanford, 2008). His new book projects address the questions of why some ruling parties concede democratization from a position of strength, how accountability does or does not develop in young democracies, and how formal institutions and informal practices interact to shape regime outcomes. He has also published articles in journals such as the *American Journal of Sociology, American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies,* and *International Organization,* among others.

**Erica Simmons** is assistant professor of political science and international studies at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Her research focuses on contentious politics in Latin America, specifically on mobilization in response to market reforms. She has previously published on qualitative methods in *Comparative Political Studies.*